How Cold War 2.0 will be different from the first one

In the post-Covid geopolitical churning, Cold War 2.0 has emerged as the most influential jargon among the geostrategic and geo-economic experts. Cold War 2.0 implies a new phase of strategic competition and rivalry between the democratic countries of the West led by the US and autocratic powers led by China and Russia, including other nations like North Korea and Iran. The expression “Cold War” reminds any lay observer of the post-Second World War cold war between the US and USSR, which unleashed a bipolar world order until 1991, when Soviet Russia disintegrated, leaving the US with its unipolar moment.

Quite Different

However, the current phase of strategic competition between the so-called democratic powers and autocratic powers cannot be described as a redux or replica of the previous Cold War, as there are many fundamental differences between the two. First and foremost, in Cold War 2.0, there are no clear-cut blocks and alliances. For example, in the South Caucasus, autocratic and Islamist Iran supports Armenia, an orthodox Christian nation, against Islamic Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey. American tilt towards Armenia, supported by their arch enemy Iran, is visible; however, the US remains friends with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia’s bonhomie is growing with Azerbaijan and Turkey as Armenia’s tilt towards the West annoys Moscow. However, Moscow’s friend Iran supports Armenia. In another interesting equation, democratic Israel supports dictatorial Azerbaijan with weapons against democratic Armenia, supported by the US, Israel’s ally.

Another example of these overlapping friendships is the Syrian conflict theatre, where Americans have allegedly supported Turkey and its Islamist proxy HTS against the Assad regime. How supporting an Islamist terror group against a legitimate dictatorial government can bolster the cause of democracy remains a million-dollar question. Interestingly, Russia, despite its proximity to Turkey in the dictator-democracy debate and South Caucasus geopolitics, feels betrayed by Ankara in Syria. China, the US adversary, remains friends with all the countries in the South Caucasus, i.e., Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Further, the US and China are projected as the main adversaries in Cold War 2.0 in the global geopolitical framework. However, both countries are the largest trade partners of each other. Beijing also has robust trade and investment ties with major Western economies. The US’ position vis-à-vis India is also very complex. The US perceives democratic India as its main ally and bulwark in the Asia-Pacific against the expanding Chinese influence; however, there is a lack of mutual trust between the two countries. Its robust ties with Pakistan, India’s archrival and China’s all-weather friend, discomfort India.

Also, the US deep state’s alleged promotion of anti-India activities includes a highly critical attitude of its civil society and academia on the issues of minority rights, Kashmir, democracy, and fundamental freedoms. Also, its tacit soft approach towards the Khalistan movement and sheltering of Khalistani extremist ideologues like Gurpatwant Singh Pannun has further strained the bilateral ties. Most recently, the US’ suspicious role in the ouster of pro-India Sheikh Hasina by supporting Islamic radicals of Jamaat-e-Islami has enraged and alarmed India.

On the question of China, despite its boundary dispute with Beijing, Delhi has thriving trade ties with China and is most unlikely to commit itself to the Western camp. Adding further to the West’s unease, India remains a robust friend of Russia and one of the largest buyers of Russian oil. Interestingly, India-Russia ties appear to be revitalised in the Modi government with new energy.

The Global South and other powerful economic and political entities, such as ASEAN, New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and Japan, also maintain strong economic ties with China and the West. Apparently, they prefer to strike a cautious balance between the two sides.

Secondly, in Cold War 2.0, unlike the ideological and territorial fault lines and demarcations, a characteristic feature of the first Cold War, the rivalry spans into other domains, most notably the mastery over critical technologies such as semiconductors, quantum computing, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and space. The competition is for centrality over infrastructure, digital production, and finance networks. Digital technology is the backbone of competitiveness in controlling these networks. Supremacy over global networks and leveraging it to control the flow of goods, information, and capital constitute the hallmarks of Cold War 2.0 instead of dividing the world into blocks over ideology and territory. Undoubtedly, ideological and territorial factors remain significant but are not the single most important determinants.

Critical Technologies

Technology happens to be not only the most critical battleground in Cold War 2.0. but also mastery over these critical technologies enables a country to deepen its geostrategic and geoeconomic footprint. Artificial intelligence will profoundly impact geopolitics because it is at the forefront of this new battleground. As an ‘accelerator technology,’ the AI will determine global dominance. AI in intelligence and military domains can revolutionise the world of security, warfare, counterterrorism, information, and propaganda war. It can improve efficiency and decision-making in complex military operations by analysing vast amounts of data, simulating adversary behaviour, automating, reconnaissance, target-identification, information gathering, speed enhancement, and precision. Also, AI can jam signals, disable missile guidance, and change the enemy forces’ data feeds. And its integration with civilian uses can enhance a nation’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP).

China has launched comprehensive AI development programs in this tech war, viz, Made in China 2025 and the New Generation AI Development Plan. However, its top-down approach significantly hinders innovative temper, which comes from a bottom-up approach. Rigid bureaucratic control and strict adherence to government dictates discourage scientists from experimenting. Secondly, China faces a deficit in critical technology chip-making equipment, leading to heavy import dependence. Nevertheless, China cannot be underestimated due to its control over supply chains, rare earth minerals, critical mineral processing technology, and vast industrial capacity. Such an edge can give it an edge in the cost dimensions of high-tech weapons. Further, China’s strategic alliance with Russia can help it synergise their scientific, economic, and technological capabilities. Also, this alliance will play an instrumental role in heralding a multipolar world order.

On the other hand, the US will curb China’s rise as a tech power by restricting Chinese access to critical technologies, imposing sanctions, and limiting US investments in Chinese tech firms. Through its arc of democratic allies like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, the US will counter China’s rise in semiconductors and chip-making. However, complex interdependencies are likely to hinder the emergence of clear-cut opponent blocks. For example, South Korea and Australia have vibrant economic ties with China. In the case of Taiwan, the US adheres to the ‘One China’ principle, and its stance on the Taiwan-China relationship is complex. Taiwan produces 70 per cent of the world’s advanced chips, and control over it can be a powerful tool of economic coercion.

Cyberwar is another critical domain of new-age warfare. Advanced capabilities in the cyber domain have become a game changer in espionage, influence operations, and war. At low costs, they can unleash massive damage on the adversary. Russia’s cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, financial systems, and electronic grids in Ukraine clearly demonstrate how cyber capabilities can inflict enormous damage at low costs—other advanced cyber capabilities in hacking, spoofing, encrypting communications, and tracking digital communications. Electronic warfare’s lethal effect became spectacularly known to the world in the recent radio and pager attacks of Israel against Hezbollah. Electronic signals detonated explosive devices concealed in pagers and mobiles. Such innovations have unleashed a significant debate on the privacy and safety of ordinary citizens.

In Cold War 2.0, the nuclear arms race is back with renewed vigour and enhanced capabilities in the form of nuclear-powered drones and submarines, hypersonic missiles, and long-range ICBMs with enhanced nuclear payload capacities. Russia’s revised nuclear posture allows it to use tactical nukes against conventional threats. In 2024, President Vladimir Putin announced further modifications to the doctrine, indicating an increased reliance on nuclear weapons for coercion and deterrence in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Russia also mentioned that it would use nuclear forces if a conventional attack posed a critical threat to the sovereignty of the country. Most recently, after Ukraine’s use of British Storm Shadow and US-made ATACMS missiles, Russia retaliated with the Orshanik, an ICBM with nuclear capabilities. Iran, on the verge of developing nuclear weapons, poses an imminent existential threat to Israel. In South Asia, the India-Pakistan conflict theatre is another sensitive nuclear flashpoint.

A crucial point to discuss while deliberating upon the tech war is the role of non-state terrorist actors in Cold War 2.0. In Cold War 2.0, amidst the revival of nation-state rivalries, the non-state terrorist actors have retained their utility and lethality both. They serve as proxy entities of nation-states, as seen in the case of the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Kashmir, etc. With the emergence of failed and dysfunctional badlands like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Bangladesh, and many African countries ruled by multiple factions of Islamist terror groups, the chances of non-state actors getting access to sensitive AI, chemical weapons, biotech, and nuclear technology have increased multifold. Besides, the non-state actors have enhanced their capabilities by using advanced encrypted communication technology and blockchain technology, particularly for terror funding.

India and the Tech War

The picture appears dismal regarding India’s overall place in the global tech war. On one hand, where countries like China, Russia, and the US are massively investing in critical technologies, India remains far behind in quality and quantity. Mainly, the quality of research and innovation in universities and research centres in India presents a gloomy picture. Young students expected to join science and technology lack sufficient motivation. They aspire to bureaucratic and administrative positions that give status and power in India’s society, heavily influenced by feudal and colonial baggage. Besides, lack of funding and sufficient job opportunities hinder the advancements in science and technology. Talented Indian youth prefer to migrate to Western universities and find a job there. India’s security establishment is heavily dominated by career bureaucrats and police officers with a generalist understanding, leaving no space for domain experts coming through lateral entry. Even if they join, they are not treated on par with career bureaucrats.

Finally, three questions remain: First, is technology itself a big challenge to the edifice of the Cold War 2.0 ideological debate of democracy versus dictatorship? With the help of advanced digital technologies and AI, outcomes and electoral processes in democracies can be compromised and sabotaged. Penetrative surveillance technology poses a major threat to privacy and freedom, the premise of democratic systems. Algorithm-based massive social media influence campaigns can significantly alter public sentiments and election results. Given that, the second question arises: Which poses a bigger challenge to democracy—technology and global tech giants or nation-states?

Third, with the ongoing global conflicts and likely escalation of conflicts in widespread global flashpoints, is it not reasonable to ask that Cold War 2.0 is entering a phase of World War 3? Seen retrospectively, it can be argued that Cold War 2.0 began with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

The author is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.